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On Thinking Like a Roman: 
The Philosophical Tradition 
of Renaissance Humanism 
Michael Mooney 
I 
The passing from life of Leonardo Bruni, so we learn from 
an inscription on his tomb in Santa Croce, "caused history to 
grieve and eloquence to be silent, while none of the Latin or Greek 
muses could hold back their tears." Remarkable as this train of 
mourners was, one would think that also philosophy could have 
troubled herself . One in a line of learned Florentine chancellors, 
Bruni had led nothing if not a well-examined life, pondering as 
well as embodying the virtues of citizenship he prized, and among 
the works he left to posterity was the corpus of Aristotle itself, 
newly translated and arranged. Yet philosophy had no part in his 
wake, or her presence among the mourners was so discreet as to 
cause no one to take note of it. 
If not even the death of Bruni, the lodestar of Quattrocento 
Florence, could work the sympathy of philosophy, should we 
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wonder that Renaissance humanism as a whole should pass into 
history so little remembered by the noblest of all disciplines? Its 
artists and architects made indelible impressions, leaving behind 
new forms and techniques, and arguably new ways in which to 
consider their works; its social and political thinkers, faced with 
the ever-shifting arrangements of Church and State, found new 
or refined bases in human reason and will for the formation of 
polities; its historians and legal scholars broke the hold of Roman 
formalism and led their disciplines to the forms in which we now 
recognize them; above all its poets, orators, and philologists, 
newly conscious of the origin and growth of words and texts, laid 
the basis for the range of studies we now call proudly the 
"humanities." But its philosophers-were they too the pride of 
Renaissance humanism, and their ideas a part of its legacy? 
In any conventional sense, the answer is likely to be no. The 
humanists produced no single towering philosophical figure, no 
Aristotle or Thomas, Leibniz or Kant, Wittgenstein or Russell. 
They devised no great system of thought, like Spinoza's or 
Hegel's, that is remembered as bearing the stamp of the era. They 
coined no single technical term for permanent deposit in the treas-
ury of philosophical vocabulary. Their contributions to logic, it is 
now recognized, helped speed the development of scientific 
methodology, and their novel conceptions of such fundamental 
categories as place, force, and continuity prepared the way for 
the new physics of the seventeenth century; yet in the long view 
of history even these achievements, like those in "moral" 
philosophy, their professional metier, seem merely tentative or 
largely derivative. 
If we are to find any lingering philosophical significance in 
Renaissance humanism, it seems, we must abandon the idea that 
philosophy is to be had only in a succession of remarkable figures 
and their well-etched systems, and must relax if not discard the 
sharp disciplinary definitions-the useful bias of the previous cen-
tury and our own-by which philosophy is set off from the work 
of other scholars who also choose to think deeply, if less systemat-
ically, on "things human and divine." That is in any event the 
course I wish to follow here, not by examining the work of any 
Renaissance thinker in particular, but by attempting to trace out the 
darkest lines of a tradition of ideas, very old indeed, in which Re-
naissance humanism as a whole has its standing and its importance. 
This lineage of humanism, or so I propose, is one of two great 
traditions of Western thought and sensibility, having a characteris-
tic set of ideas and assumptions which, in the final analysis, are 
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irreducible to those of any larger or grander scheme. The tradition 
took root in the formative years of Western culture itself and has 
evolved over the centuries through various permutations, down 
to our own day. I choose to call it the "Roman" tradition, in 
contrast to the "Greek" -terms nonetheless which have less to 
do with the biases of any nation or region than with forms or 
types of the Western spirit itself. 
II 
In and beyond the marks of family, clan, and ethnos by which 
we also have our identity, and in and through the political and 
religious institutions which inform our values and actions, we 
recognize in the deepest reaches of our spirit a cluster of ideals 
or "excellences" toward which we all as Westerners almost instinc-
tively strive. To Homer's Odysseus, the virtues of our humanity 
are three-comeliness of form, strength of mind, and beauty of 
words-----each of which resembles, in its highest form, a godlike 
perfection . Though sometimes sought beyond all reason, physical 
beauty seems seldom to be ranked with the virtues of mind and 
tongue: it is perhaps too evanescent, or seems too much a given, 
too little achieved, to hold out its claim against the others. Between 
the perfections of knowledge and eloquence, however, we find 
in our history, as indeed in ourselves, a regular and often un-
friendly battle for ascendancy. For who is it finally who commands 
the culture-philosophers and scientists, the intellectual elite who 
know and now arrange the structures of our world? Or is it the 
poets and orators, those who inspirit, lead, and guide our society? 
Walk the streets of New York City, that pinnacle of Western 
aspirations, and one finds this issue debated in stone . At the heart 
of Rockefeller Center rests the golden figure of Prometheus, por-
trayed in the very act of stealing fire from the gods, a worthy 
tribute to the kingdoms of business and technology which sur-
round it; while in Federal Circle to the south of the Center stands 
a row of majestic court buildings, each inscribed with a more 
noble sentiment than the next, promising that justice is universal 
and blind, that truth will out, and that each shall have his own. 
In which of these monuments are we to glory? Or more precisely: 
in which of the two do we find the center of our culture, the 
signature of our best efforts? In which do we have our highest 
and proudest achievement? 
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Consciously or not, the builders of New York have set out 
for us in graphic form the same tension of soul present in the 
elegant creation myth of Plato's Protagoras. Prometheus, we recall, 
was only one of the heroes in that great drama. Fitted out by 
Epimetheus with wings and hoofs, tough skins and special colora-
tion, and given assorted means for nourishing and procreating 
themselves, the brutes of the earth were provided for well and 
made the human mortals-"naked, unshod, unbedded, and un-
armed"-seem frightfully vulnerable by comparison. Thus Pro-
metheus, in a bold act of genius, stole from Hephaestus and 
Athena the skills of the arts and crafts, together with fire, and 
gave these to man so that he might protect and preserve his 
species. Inspecting the result some time later, Zeus could rejoice 
at what man had achieved with his technical arts-houses and 
clothes, shoes and bedding, foods of every kind-yet he also 
discovered a pervasive tragedy: whenever they gathered them-
selves into cities for protection against the beasts, men devoured 
instead themselves, for they lacked the political wisdom that Zeus 
alone possessed. Thus Zeus sent Hermes to give mankind "respect 
for others" and "a sense of justice." And how shall I distribute 
these gifts? Hermes asked. As the arts were distributed-that is, 
on the principle that one trained expert suffices for many laymen? 
Or shall I distribute them to all alike? "Let all have their share," 
Zeus replied. 
Asked to ponder the Protagoras, the Greeks and the Romans 
among us will differ sharply in their reactions. The Greek will 
linger in triumph on the words that tell of Prometheus' theft of 
fire from the gods, finding therein the promise of knowledge and 
power to the select of the race; the Roman, in contrast, will read 
further, nodding pensively at the news that Zeus, in a desperate 
effort to equip our kind for life in society, gave us in addition to 
fire a sense of justice, distributing it in equal measure to all. The 
Greek is not indifferent to the predicament of man in society, but 
he will try, as if on principle, to treat it as a technical or scientific 
problem. Seeing truth as the privilege of experts, he will look for 
a Philosopher-King to regulate our affairs. Or he will contemplate 
a system of natural law and deduce from it the principles of right 
living. Or he will turn the sense of justice into a science of justice, 
formulating its tenets and procedures and having them adminis-
tered in secure, arcane ways. Or he will think out an ontology of 
society, a grand utopian vision, and from it devise a Five-Year 
Plan for the political economy. For the Roman, on the other hand, 
the path to a just society is altogether messier and more painful. 
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As a common, not a reserved gift, he will argue, the sense of 
justice is concomitant with humanity itself, such that our history 
is its history . It may rely on knowledge and make use of 
techniques, but finally it is neither of these. It takes root in social 
urgencies, in the need to act when the facts are muddled or their 
meaning unclear, and the form it acquires, when finally it does, 
is given it in the songs of bards, the words of poets, the eloquence 
of jurists . Over time it is built up and collected, some of it written, 
some of it not, and in that form takes on authority and a noble 
name. That name is jurisprudence. 
III 
Such, then, are the contrasting sensitivities of the Western 
spirit. On the Greek view, the apogee of human culture is science 
and abstract thought; on the Roman, it is eloquence and the pru-
dence of law. As disjunctive as these views seem, rarely does 
either assert itself with absolute validity or give no credibility to the 
other, and there are instances to be found-the work of Aristotle 
being one-in which a plain effort is made to combine the two 
emphases. In the main, however, specific individuals, eras, indeed 
whole cultures in the West are marked by one of these two modes 
of sensing and thinking, and thus of ordering their actions. This 
is, I realize, a grand historical claim, one that I can do no more 
than propose here, for my concern at the moment is to lay out 
the case for the primacy of eloquence and jurisprudence, the 
characteristic bias of what I am calling the "Roman" tradition. To 
do this, however, I must first give some thought to the human 
experience of space and time, for it is in it that the Romans have 
the basis for their claim. 
I am not interested here in the metaphysics of time and space, 
whether they form a continuum or an empty void, or whether 
they have an absolute or relational reality, or whether they are 
separate or correlative entities; I wish only to remark on how we 
are conscious of them and how we act as a consequence of that 
experience. For whatever the ontological status of space and time 
may be, our experience of them is neither simple nor univocal, 
but embraces at least two recognizable forms. 
Routinely in our everyday life, and always in a scientific life, 
we experience and act upon time and space as measured or 
measurable quantities, as settled or fixed points within a struc-
tured universe. No sooner did Rhea produce a child, the myth 
tells us, than Chronos her husband would devour it. So it is that 
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we speak of chronology, time that merely passes, one moment 
like the next, each arising only to be swallowed whole. This is 
the time of a ticking watch, a succession of homogeneous units, 
the kind of time that seems "physical" or external, the kind we 
need not internalize or be aware of, much less understand, but 
merely take account of in our plans and expectations. So also 
space on this account, which we do not experience as a place or 
even a cluster of places, but merely as size or dimension. This is 
the experience of space as expanse, as a definable stretch of terri-
tory or distance-acreage, furlongs, light years. As with time that 
is quantified, space that is measured is public and reliable, as 
familiar to us as the furniture in our home, requiring of us only 
that we not ignore it when reckoning or moving about. 
This first experience of time and space is of capital importance 
in our lives, for without it we could not schedule our trains, 
rendezvous with a friend, measure the pressure of our blood, 
predict our weather, or put a man on the moon. Our dependence 
on it is continuous if largely unconscious, and to the extent it fails 
us or we become incapable of it we are literally "disoriented," the 
proper subject of human pity if not psychiatric attention. "Snap 
out of it," we advise a daydreamer, while the schizophrenic who 
is inhabiting two "worlds" we must occasionally hospitalize as a 
danger to himself and society. The essence of measured time and 
space is uniformity or continuity, which makes of them "domestic" 
realities, completely reliable and predictable. Time that is mea-
sured has no surprises and in this sense is "timeless" or eternal, 
even as measured space is "placeless" or utopian, one spot like 
the next. They are as such the contours of cosmos, our universe 
as structured whole, and the necessary conditions for manipulat-
ing our environment in a regular and confident way. Because of 
them we can even seek to know our world through its principles 
or archai, to discover the process beneath all appearance and 
change, indeed the reasons for change itself. We call such knowl-
edge theoria, science. 
As necessary as this first experience of time and space is, 
there is every indication that we find it, in the end, intolerable, 
or at least insufficient; for however regular our lives or disciplined 
our minds, not every moment is the same to us, nor are any two 
spots alike. "That was a long lecture," a student will quip; "Too 
long," his friend will reply, and in that simple phrase tell us that 
time has quality as well as quantity. Time always passes, to be 
sure, but it also flies or drags, is full or is empty, and bears 
numerous other relationships to the lives it defines. Depression 
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can flatten this experience of time, turning each moment into a 
replica of the other, but to a spirit that is truly alive a moment of 
crisis can never be mistaken for daily routine, nor will an hour 
spent in the arms of someone he loves be like that of any other. 
For time in our experience is not mere chronology; it is also occur-
rence or event, having consequence and particularity. It can even 
be unique. Space too, when experienced this way, loses the safe 
homogeneity it has as dimension and becomes a texture of relation-
ships, a place. Set a vase of flowers on an empty table and you 
bring the entire room to life, giving it focus and coherence, every 
angle and line changed: the space that before was too readily an 
expanse is now defiantly a place, something to see and to come 
to terms with. A cathedral, a prison cell, a village square, a hospital 
room, any space that comforts or challenges or moves us deeply 
is so resolutely a place that it requires of us an effort of mind to 
think of it, like every space, as a bounded expanse, even as a 
child of five is not easily convinced that its mother is also simply 
a woman. 
Experienced qualitatively, space and time become for us the 
places and events by which we mark our lives and know ourselves, 
and thus judge and are judged. Some places and events are so 
wholly private in their significance that they are idiosyncratic, 
known only by ourselves for what they are and for what we are 
as a consequence of them. We choose not to share them, or we 
have abandoned all hope of ever having them shared, and thus 
we enjoy or endure them in silence. Most places and events, 
however, are in some way shared realities, defining more lives 
than our own and taking on in this way a public or quasi-public 
character. Even one's birthday, which could never be to another 
the event it is to one's self, is the possession of those who re-
member and help celebrate it. One's death, on the other hand, is 
an event at all only to the extent that it creates loss and causes 
one's memory or accomplishments to be kept alive. Few places 
and events, of course, are regularly acknowledged or celebrated, 
but those that are give point to our public and social lives. We 
christen ships, throw housewarming parties, and surround a new 
government with pomp, circumstance, and the striking of medals. 
We set aside spaces as sacred or special and respect those that 
history has consecrated; we pilgrimage to spots of religious power, 
reenact battles in situ, and protect the ruins which contain the 
great moments of our past. Nature herself seems a part of the 
effort, her wonders and marvels-deserts and falls, canyons and 
mountain peaks-being "natural" places of legend and lore, fervor 
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and refreshment, while the seasons of her life, reflected in those 
of our own, prompt us to establish, as if by instinct, elaborate 
cycles of secular and religious feasts. 
Individually and culturally, our lives are "fixed" by places 
and events. We are caught up in them as if in a web, having in 
them our bearing and orientation . To be "in place" and a part of 
events, however, means also to be in flux, and thus in a kind of 
permanent jeopardy. Not only is the web of our own life's mean-
ings essentially tenuous, as often vague and uncertain as it is clear 
and pronounced, but it is also a web that rarely if ever completely 
overlaps with that of anyone else, much less with the elaborate and 
complex set of rites and customs, verities and habits which form 
our society or stamp the culture we know as our own . Thus life 
in society is essentially tense, endlessly exposed-more sharply 
at times than at others-to the rise and fall of meaning. The hopes 
of one class or region are folly to another; the places and events 
that sustain one generation seem plain or trivial to the next. Even 
when stabilized within a society, meaning can be eroded from 
without, as when one people's values clash with another's, or 
when the conditions of life itself are altered . 
Doubtless there are patterns in social change, as there are in 
history itself, and to come to know the principles of psyche, eco-
nomy, and society is to achieve some purchase on our lives. In 
and beyond any success of this kind, however, we sense funda-
mentally the need to come to wonder about ourselves, to discover 
less the archai of our lives than their topoi, their significant "places" 
or moments, and to bring these findings to expression. Our habits 
and gestures are the silent beginning of this process, while diaries, 
letters, and autobiographies are its highest and most articulate 
form. Society at large has much the same need, and to similar 
result. Artists and songsters have social as well as personal visions, 
which they state in anger or in praise or with mere indifference. 
Pundits, commentators, and holders of public office are obliged or 
driven to speak freely about society, debating how its goals are 
adequate or lacking, and how its institutions serve or fail the 
public weal. Claimants, lawyers, and justices, if they are to have 
any success at all, must catch up the drama of an individual's life 
within a relevant context of society's resolve and experience; at 
their best they will reveal the demands of stated ideals or open 
new vistas on a culture's past and future-the accomplishment 
of the best biographers and historians. Most fundamental of all, 
citizens themselves give voice to their experience simply by the 
· way they arrange their lives, acquiring new tastes and abandoning 
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others, continuing or refining the mores of their parents, choosing 
to maintain or to reject the civic heroes and celebrations to which 
they were introduced as growing children. To come to word in 
this way means above all else to consider and judge the topoi or 
"places" of one's life, to seek out its strongest or most significant 
moments and bring them into some coherence. The knowledge 
achieved in this way is true and reliable knowledge, though it 
bears little resemblance to the knowledge of science. It is not un-
interested in pattern, repetition, and formula, but it takes its focus 
in singular, concrete places and events. It is not the knowledge 
that conquers change or renders it harmless; it is the conscious 
innerside of change itself. Called by its most general name, this 
knowledge is poiesis, knowing by making, poetry. 
IV 
It is in the full, poignant sense of time and space that oratory 
has its origin, and with it the philosophical tradition I am calling 
the "Roman." "The ambition to speak well," writes Cicero, follow-
ing an opinion of Aristotle, "does not arise when men are engaged 
in establishing government, nor occupied with the conduct of 
war, nor shackled and chained by the authority of kings. Upon 
peace and tranquility eloquence attends as their ally; it is, one 
may say, the offspring of well-established civic order." The "order" 
claimed here as the basis for oratory is anything but patient, dull, 
or complacent. It is an entirely active order of things, one in which 
men are thrown back on their own resources and made to feel 
responsible for the shape of their lives. "Order" and "crisis" are 
here coexistent, though the crisis is one of liberty, not of repression 
or of the very struggle for existence. Cicero makes this clear in 
the example he gives. After living for years under tyranny, the 
inhabitants of Sicily cast out the invaders and set about restoring 
their former way of life. Being acute and disputatious by nature, 
they sought the restitution of private property through legal ar-
gumentation, but the process they followed was careless and un-
methodical. Thus two of their own, Corax and Tisias, drew up 
precepts and rules for making an argument, and so invented the 
art of rhetoric. 
Even if apocryphal, the story serves well to show that rhetoric, 
as the logic of public discourse, is rooted in social urgency. We 
notice, first of all, how issues of time and space press upon the 
Sicilians, for in their initial liberation they are temporally and 
spatially disoriented. So long as the tyrants were in control, time 
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as a social entity was suspended and the places that once gave 
texture and specificity to the Sicilians' lives were merged as if into 
a single, alien domain. Their lands, to be sure, remained familiar 
in their simple dimensionality, and chronological time continued 
its relentless course, taking its toll on all things natural, including 
themselves. But the places and events which before gave structure 
to their lives fell victim, with liberty itself, to the ways of the 
tyrants. With tyranny's end, all this has changed: places and 
events are again in their control and suddenly there is need to 
make connections with the way things were. 
Every rhetorical act takes its start in an urgency of this kind. 
Always it is impelled by the single, insistent question, quid sit 
agendum, what is to be done? In an extreme sense, well exploited 
by the critics of our day, every moment of civil life is intrinsically 
rhetorical. But to the ancients who formulated rhetorical theory, 
three situations were paradigmatic: the court of law, in which two 
barristers (or a barrister and a judge) wrestle over the fate of an 
accused-and this they called forensic or judicial oratory; the polit-
ical assembly, in which courses of state action are debated---deliber-
ative oratory; and the public address, in which praise or blame is 
distributed or a view set forth on an issue of interest or con-
troversy-demonstrative or epideictic oratory . In the case of our 
legendary Sicilians, the rhetorical situation is framed by the need 
they have to set the boundaries of one another's property. A 
simple resumption of the past is not possible, for the whim of the 
tyrants and the mere passage of time have altered the past beyond 
recognition. Fences have been removed and fields redivided; flocks 
have been combined or thinned; buildings have been destroyed 
or added to; implements have been lost or stolen; families have 
been changed through marriage and death; loyalties have shifted 
and memories faded; and in many other ways the past has been 
put beyond ready reach. Yet, for all its fragmented, almost mock-
ing presence in the chiaroscuro image of it in current arrangements, 
it is the past that must be bridged if the new order of things is to 
be a just one. How is this to be done? 
The Sicilians have that "sense of justice" that Zeus sent 
through Hermes to supplement our technical skills; indeed we · 
may assume that it is available in equal measure to each of them, 
such that no one, by virtue of birth or status, has a superior moral 
imagination. As with every virtue, however, justice speaks louder 
in abstraction than in context. The voice it lacks in context must 
be furnished it by passsionate but fair-minded men, each advocat-
ing a vision of what is, under the circumstances, rational, good, 
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and proper. What one man asserts, another will deny; what one 
urges as appropriate another rejects as foolish or inequitable. In 
classical rhetoric, a situation of this kind is called a causa-a "case" 
from the standpoint of the adjudicators, a "cause" from that of 
the contenders. Like boxers squaring off, the contenders take their 
"stands" in the matter; thus rhetoric speaks also of the status of 
the case, the issue or issues that emerge from it and need to be 
decided. If the case is not plain, if the course of action to be taken 
is not immediately obvious to all who look at the matter openly, 
then it must be argued, each contender setting forth that idea of 
equitable action that seems to him most compelling. 
What is at stake in the case is not merely the claims of the 
contenders, but also the shape of the community, its sense of 
things past, present, and above all future. Unlike a philosophical 
debate, in which differing opinions are tested for their logic, coher-
ence, and supporting evidence, a rhetorical argument puts society 
itself to the test. The argument must of course be clear, consistent, 
and founded on valid testimony, but its final appeal is to a vision 
of social resolve and behavior, one that is forceful enough to 
persuade. In the case at hand, our Sicilians are concerned for their 
lands, but in the social rather than the physical sense. The prop-
erties they are contending for have a natural existence which is 
largely untouched by the words spoken over them and about them; 
what they lack is social reality, a clear, unequivocal relationship 
to the people who inhabit and cultivate them. That is a reality 
that can be brought into being through argument alone. The de-
cisions the Sicilians reach may have a marginal, accidental effect 
on crop yield, productivity, and similar natural and economic 
realities; but their choices will effect themselves as a people in a 
fundamental way, both in the literal sense of giving legal reality 
to what is contended for, and in the higher, moral sense of defining 
their grasp of justice. 
V 
The rhetorical act, then, is the formal act of society in crisis, the 
process through which it judges itself and determines its future. 
Structurally seen, the act is a contest of "things and words" -res 
et verba, in the classical phrase-of arguments drawn from the 
traditions of the people and the facts at hand and expressed in lan-
guage that is forceful and effective. To have its effect, an argument 
must not only state a vision; it must also make it plausible, more 
consistent with society's sense of itself than that of any rival vision. 
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A society in crisis is not one in chaos. Chaos implies the 
absence of order and the consequent inability to conduct civil life. 
It can descend on a society through an invasion from without, 
either military or cultural, or it can be the result of an internal 
development, the gradual weakening of communication leading 
to a state in which, as the ancient saying had it, "there are as 
many opinions as heads." A crisis, on the other hand, is a chal-
lenge to consensus, the natural tugging at social bonds, at times 
quite severe, that is endemic to a vibrant culture. A healthy society 
is not one that avoids conflict but one that can channel it into 
established forms of argumentation and learn to abide by its out-
comes. Such was the triumph of our ancient Sicilians, and because 
of it they were praised by Aristotle and Cicero as the model of a 
civil society. 
The invention of the Sicilians was rhetoric, understood as the 
logic of argumentation, indeed of all civil discourse. Discourse of 
this kind is expressly nontechnical, a dialogue among citizens, 
not experts. What does it mean to reason with the people, arguing 
among the simple who cannot take in a complicated argument? 
It means first to canvass a situation to its full extent, trying to see 
it in all its many aspects and selecting from among them those 
which are most trenchant and persuasive. It means also to enlarge 
on particulars, to state as general maxims the opinions one's lis-
teners hold about their own situations. And it means finally to 
catch up one's argument in stirring images, in language that can 
so much embrace one's self, one's listeners, and the shared situ-
ation that all are impelled to act effectively and as one. Discourse 
of this kind is indeed a showing of reasons (logoi), reasons that 
reveal the particulars of the case and appeal to the common sense 
of things. But it is more: it is an affective bonding between speaker 
and listeners. Through the demeanor of the orator (ethos) and the 
emotions he evokes (pathos), justice is seen and felt, and only thus 
truly known. 
The res or "things" of an argument are the facts of a case 
illuminated by relevant "places" (topoi) in a society's life. In a 
genuine controversy, both the facts to be emphasized and the 
"places" to be invoked are matters of choice, requiring the keenest 
judgment of the orator; if the facts are obvious and the sense of 
society is clear, the case is plain and need not be argued. The 
precedents for a case-the customs, laws, habits and decisions 
that precede it-are, by definition, "authoritative," being the 
marks of society's prior achievements, its "just prejudices," as 
Edmund Burke put it so well. They are innately powerful, bearing 
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the weight of past triumphs, and must be reckoned with as the 
simple facts of society. Equally powerful, though differently so, 
are the facts of the case, the unique set of circumstances that 
somehow confront a society and its accustomed ways, demanding 
attention and adjudication. An alleged crime, a civil conflict, a 
social crisis, a political debate-whatever describes the challenge 
at hand-it must be dealt with through argument and action. 
Argumentation reveals itself as a process of construction, the 
artful adaptation of facts to precedents and of precedents to facts. 
This process, moreover, is not merely mental; it is social, and thus 
it is bound to language (verba)-to images, gestures, and words. 
Language is the necessary bridge between precedents and facts. To 
be sure, a precedent-a maxim, an aphorism, a sentence, a law-is 
itself language, but it is frozen language; its words confront us as 
authority. A fact is equally stubborn, claiming a peculiarity that 
resists all classification. Both the precedent and the fact stand 
within the flow of living speech, which in turn reflects a society's 
sensus communis. It is thus to language, more precisely to 
metaphor, that the orator turns, to language that is at once familiar 
and fresh, seeking that linguistic bridge between present and past 
that will be recognized as most "apt." In this process of selection 
and construction, victory goes to the ingenious, the contender 
who can so marshal "things" and "words," ideas and language, 
as to say what is-at the moment-"called for," suited to the 
occasion, fitting and proper, appropriate and decorous, and so 
advance the cause of public life. His victory consists in having 
shown that his own sense (sensus proprius) of the relation of the 
facts and the precedents better conforms with the sense of society 
(sensus communis) than that of any opponent. 
The outcome of the process of argument is the sententia, the 
judgment reached or the opinion advanced. Though pronounced 
in the context of an individual case, such as all instances of oratory 
are, the sententia has a universal character, an authority reflected 
stylistically in its brevity. Usually one sentence in length, a sententia 
literally punctuates a discourse, bringing it to a point and a close. 
Here thought and language interpenetrate, reinforcing one 
another: the last expression is the most thoughtful, and the last 
thought is the most expressive. In the context of law, the sententia 
is particularly poignant. A "sentence" in court is both language 
and idea, both verba and res, each commanding authority. To "pass 
sentence" means both to "render judgment," thus bringing a pro-
cess of reasoning to a close, and to "make a statement," thus 
adding a text to the stock of public language in which culture has 
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its identity. As a spoken judgment (judicatum), a sentence holds 
authority (auctoritas) and so orders the life of a people; as a norm 
of social existence, it becomes precedent (praeiudicium) for further 
cases of its kind, such that future plaintiffs must build their claims 
with reference to it. 
Like hermeneutics, then, rhetoric too has its circle. It deals 
in matters of deliberate human action, the truth of which must 
be established through language. In cases of law, the reality of a 
deed is only then constituted when set within the context of justice 
and social values. In political debate, a proposed action becomes 
real only when fitted by its supporters within a polity's sense of 
its heritage and its dreams. In these instances, moreover, lan-
guage-particular, chosen words and images-participates in the 
making of truth. The legal status of the accused is established 
through argument, and one case becomes precedent for the next. 
Political action is shaped through debate, the outcome of which 
is the basis for future deliberations. In such a wise, as the ancients 
liked to say, "reason itself is written down," giving standing and 
identity to the culture whose voice it is. 
